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1981, J.D. 1985, Northwestern University. The author thanks William McJohn
and others for helpful discussions of these topics. Copyright (c) 1998 by the
President and Fellows of Harvard College.

Pamela Gray's Artificial Legal Intelligence offers an imaginative, utopian view of
the technological implementation of legal reasoning. After surveying a number
of programs applying artificial intelligence techniques to legal reasoning,
Artificial Legal Intelligence offers a vision of the law as a holistic entity on the
verge of evolving into a codified computer system of legal services. 1 In this
vision, answers to legal questions would be as readily available online as stock
quotes, soccer scores, and flight schedules.
Artificial Legal Intelligence presents a thoughtprovoking approach to both
computational models of legal reasoning and the use of evolutionary thinking
about the law. Drawing on a prodigious amount of research, Gray looks beyond
the rather technical approach common in the field and attempts to place
artificial legal intelligence within the broad structure of legal history. This Note
first summarizes Gray's vision of a computerized artificial legal intelligence, a
vision of developments in both technology and legal history. It next discusses
how Gray's concept of the future runs counter to trends in both artificial
intelligence and legal theory in some important ways. At the same time, Gray's
book, by freeing itself from present technological constraints, provides a wider
vision than many more technical discussions of artificial intelligence. In
particular, her view of the evolution of law brings in social and cultural factors
often ignored by discussions of legal reasoning. The last part of this Note
considers, more broadly, how evolutionary analysis can provide a fruitful
method for analyzing legal reasoning.
The broad scope of Artificial Legal Intelligence results in rapid coverage of
great amounts of material. As a prelude to the book's ambitious program, the
first chapter quickly covers the development of electronic computers, the first
endeavors in artificial intelligence to use computers to model human reasoning,
and subsequent attempts to apply artificial intelligence to the law (pp. 1268).
As Gray's wideranging overview shows, a number of creative research
projects have applied artificial intelligence techniques to the domain of legal
reasoning. 2 Three fields of artificial intelligence are most relevant to work in
the legal area: casebased reasoning, expert systems, and neural networks. 3
Artificial intelligence programs, such as the legal reasoning programs discussed
below, can have characteristics of more than one of these fields. 4
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A number of artificial intelligence systems implement various types of case
based reasoning. 5 A casebased reasoning program seeks to solve a problem
by relying on solutions to previous, similar problems. 6 Such an approach has
an obvious affinity to the use of precedents in legal reasoning. Anne Von der
Lieth Gardner's GP program attempted to use previous cases to distinguish
easy from hard cases in the area of contract law (pp. 5961). 7 The Norwegian
Research Centre for Computers and Law developed SARA, an attempt to model
the differing weights given to relevant factors in applying legal norms (p. 33).
Kevin Ashley's HYPO system used a database of some thirty cases to compare
a case to precedent cases, examining whether similarities existed with respect
to given factors (pp. 6264).
The second category of artificial intelligence is the expert system, which seeks
to reproduce the way that a human expert applies her skills to specific types of
problems. 8 A notable early project was L.T. McCarty's TAXMAN program, which
sought to aid the formulation of arguments in tax cases by developing a formal
representation of legal concepts and arguments (p. 39). 9 Alan Tyree's FINDER
program sought to automate the analysis of deciding whether a found piece of
property belonged to its finder by asking ten key questions and attempting to
determine the result of the case from the answers. 10 Carole Hafner's LIRS, an
effort toward an intelligent document retrieval system, developed a formal
language to represent the legal concepts of negotiable instrument law in order
to create a database of cases and statutes linked by those concepts. 11
A third relevant field of artificial intelligence is the work on artificial neural
networks. 12 Neural networks are intended to function in a way analogous to
the networks of neurons that comprise the brain. 13 In a neural network, the
input points are connected to output points by a simulated network. 14 The
network can be "trained" by adjusting the interconnections or adding new
connections in the network, until a given input produces the desired output.
Once the network is properly adjusted, it should yield the correct output for
future inputs. Because a neural network should learn a rule based on a number
of cases, and should be flexible enough to adjust to new cases, the application
of the concept to legal reasoning has been readily noted (p. 67). However,
there have been few attempts to implement artificial neural networks that
perform legal reasoning (perhaps for reasons that will be discussed below).
The greatest difficulty is that the "input" of a legal case is much broader and
harder to define than in other applications, such as pattern recognition with
medical images. In addition, a neural network yields output in a less
predictable manner than a casebased program or expert system. Applied to
the legal domain, a neural network would give a result without the reasons for
it  a "blackbox" approach that fits poorly with the need for justifications in
the legal world. Nevertheless, there have been steps toward using artificial
neural networks to determine the weight given to factors in a set of legal
decisions (pp. 6667). 15
Thus, there have been a number of projects that claim some progress toward
automating legal reasoning. This naturally raises the question, to what extent
do the programs actually model the task at issue, or, alternatively, succeed in
producing results similar to human decisions? Artificial Legal Intelligence,
however, gives little attention to these questions. Nor does the book spend
much time on the larger philosophical issues that have loomed over the field in
recent years: whether it is possible for machines to be intelligent, to
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understand concepts, or to have consciousness. 16 The debate on such issues
has attracted attention from disciplines ranging across philosophy, computer
science, neuroscience, and physics. 17 Participants have staked out a range of
positions, from the idea that people are simply machines that can be emulated,
to the opposite extreme, where human consciousness and intelligence are
inherently beyond human technological capacity. 18
Artificial Legal Intelligence steers clear of these deep, muddy, embattled
waters. Gray also does not linger over questions of how well existing programs
actually perform legal reasoning. Instead, the book makes the questionable
assumption that artificial intelligence will be achieved, and turns to a vision of
a future, allencompassing computer system. Gray bases this vision on two
interrelated views of the law: "holistic legal intelligence" (pp. 75114) and
"cyclic paradigms of legal intelligence" (pp. 11536). These concepts make
explicit some major assumptions of more modest approaches to computerizing
legal reasoning.
The term, "holistic legal intelligence," has a contemporary ring, but the concept
captures several widespread assumptions about legal reasoning that have long
buttressed the legal profession. In this view, legal reasoning is a unique,
autonomous form of reasoning. The advocacy and advising of lawyers, like the
decisionmaking processes of judges, rely on specialized skills that use
concepts and rules of inference that could be represented in symbolic form.
Accordingly, Gray presents the development of holistic legal intelligence as the
progression of a single discipline, in the same way that physics can be
described as a series of developments within a single domain (pp. 98114).
Indeed, Gray goes on to associate legal intelligence with the "science of legal
choice" (p. 137). Legal reasoning is seen as simply a process of "moving from
one unit of legal data to the next to make a selection" (p. 168). This view binds
together the idea that law is an autonomous discipline with the notion that the
law consists of its formal representations, whether in statutes, cases, or other
written embodiments, and that such representations are linked together by a
coherent logic of some sort (p. 75168). Both assumptions  law's autonomy
and law's formalizability  would pave the way for the law to be captured in a
single computer program as Gray envisions.
The other principal reason Gray offers for the likely computerization of the
legal process is a theory about the historical development of legal systems,
termed "cyclic paradigms of legal intelligence" (p. 115). In this view, each legal
system evolves through successive life cycles, and each life cycle in turn is
comprised of five stages: "ritual, common law, theory, casuistry, and
codification" (p. 115). Gray accordingly describes the history of the Roman and
English legal systems as respectively divided into these five stages. In the
ritual stage of Roman law, blood feuds between clans were supplanted as
dispute mechanisms by the decisionmaking of patrician priests, who
performed the tasks of the legal system through formalized rituals and
invocation of memorized rules (p. 116). The formation of the Roman republic
saw a transition to the common law stage, where the principles of written civil
law and specialization of administrative and judicial officials replaced the
arbitrary decisionmaking of priests (pp. 11819). The stage of theory began
when Roman jurists developed Roman natural law, influenced by theoretical
approaches adopted from Greek philosophy and rhetoric (pp. 12123). In the
succeeding stage of casuistry, the spread of Roman law across the empire to
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peoples unfamiliar with Roman legal theory opened the way to judicial
proceedings geared more to particularized, factbased reasoning than
application of the abstractions of the theory stage (pp. 12728). The final
stage, codification, came with the Theodosian Code and the Justinian Code
which succeeded earlier, less comprehensive efforts (pp. 13235).
The Roman legal system, in Gray's view, was succeeded in evolutionary
fashion by the English legal system, likewise divided into five stages. The ritual
stage, in the ninth to eleventh centuries, saw efficient, if arbitrary, trials by
ordeal  determining guilt or innocence by whether the accused would heal
after being burned by a hot iron or a cauldron of boiling water, or by whether
the accused floated when dropped in a stream (p. 117). Less violent was the
ritual of oath, where success of a claim depended simply on how many "oath
helpers" a party could recruit in support (pp. 11617). The common law stage,
running from the twelfth to fourteenth centuries in Gray's model, replaced
trials by ordeal or oath with advocacy in verbal form before itinerant royal
justices, or in more vigorous form with trial by battle (pp. 11921). Courts
developed and sought governance from customary law rather than divine
intervention (pp. 12122). The theory stage coincided with an increase of the
powers of Parliament during the fifteenth through seventeenth centuries (pp.
12326). Rather than adhering strictly and literally to customary law, courts
took a more abstract approach, with two important developments: analogical
reasoning from precedents permitted broader application of legal principles,
and the institution of courts of Chancery permitted equitable considerations to
override mechanical legal results (pp. 12426). Gray sees the stage of
casuistry in English law as extending from the eighteenth century to the
present. Systematic reporting of judicial decisions, together with the tomes of
Blackstone and others, permitted the construction of a comprehensive body
of law resting on legal principles defined through particular cases (pp. 12830).
The English legal system, in Gray's view, now stands on the brink of the
codification stage. Gray notes that some areas of English law have been
reduced to consolidated legislation or to systematically organized judicial
precedent (p. 135). Gray argues that the sheer volume and complexity of
English law means the system will be unworkable without computer
codification. Fortunately, conscious choice rather than historical forces will
determine which route the English system takes: "There is now an opportunity
to review legal intelligence, and consciously determine any evolutionary leap in
the form of codification" (p. 135). Such a codification would go well beyond
making legal materials accessible online; rather, artificial intelligence would
provide the equivalent of a lawyer or judge, in computer form (pp. 13536).
Such a development, Gray suggests, is necessary not only to preserve the
functioning of the English legal system but also to preserve the autonomy of
the legal system. Extending her analogy from Roman history, Gray warns that
unless "designer programs" preserve the vitality of the English legal system,
political authority will be overrun by forces from the East, as was the case with
Rome, with the European Union bureaucrats of Brussels playing the role of the
Huns and Visigoths (pp. 13536).
The latter third of Artificial Legal Intelligence is devoted to Gray's vision of an
artificial intelligence program that would function to automate the "collective
legal intelligence" (pp. 197314). Such a system, Gray suggests, could be
SURMET (SURvival METasystem), a "legal information system containing both
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the knowledge and processes of human intelligence" (p. 204). SURMET would
have subsystems for evolutionary ethics and principles, for knowledge, and for
the law itself (p. 203). Evolutionary principles and ethics would be included to
foster the survival of humans and culture, on the theory that the law is "a
method by which people survive" (p. 209). Such a system, a "Leviathan
computer codification of English legal expertise," could provide enormous social
benefits. All people, not just clients able to retain lawyers, would have ready
access to legal expertise at all times. Making the legal system thus universally
accessible, Gray suggests, would strengthen the social contract among people
by spreading the benefits of the law (p. 313). There would be a "new,
rationalised social cohesion through the legal system" (p. 10). The social
security afforded by such universal legal aid would in turn foster other
advances in human endeavor (p. 134). 19 Such benefits would not be
restricted to the English legal system. On the theory that the underlying forms
of legal intelligence in various jurisdictions are similar, a single form of
intelligent program could process the laws of various countries (p. 2).
Gray wisely makes little effort to describe how such programs would be built
from existing technologies or their foreseeable successors. Indeed, the
feasibility of such an enterprise receives little discussion in the book. One of
the few discussions of actual implementation comes in her characterization of
legal intelligence as "four dimensional" (p. 223). The four dimensions are, first,
the concepts of law; second and third, the arrangements of such legal concepts
to suit the plaintiff and defendant respectively; and fourth, the resulting legal
outcome or strategy (pp. 22223). So characterized, Gray argues the law is
made more readily amenable to computerization. Even if that novel and
ambitious claim holds (and the book offers little specific guidance on how
particular cases would actually fit into such a paradigm), it would be only one
step toward bridging the vast gulf between present computer legal systems
and what Gray envisions.
Gray's vision is so futuristic as to defy specific argument. The capabilities of
computers in the distant future is pure speculation at this time. Indeed, Gray's
picture of a fully computerized legal process runs counter to trends in the
study of both artificial intelligence and legal reasoning. With respect to artificial
intelligence, Gray speaks as though the first projects in artificial legal
intelligence have shown the way toward computer implementation of legal
reasoning. But, as with artificial intelligence research generally, the picture is
more complex. As many researchers have noted in recent years, the prospects
that artificial intelligence programs will replicate human cognition have
paradoxically diminished with research. 20 The more work that is done in the
area, the more difficult the problem seems to be. Several decades ago, when
electronic computers were new and rapidly assuming tasks that had previously
taken great amounts of human work, many confident predictions were made
that the time of true machine intelligence was not far off. 21 Indeed, in
succeeding years, computer programs were created that could accomplish
difficult tasks  proving mathematical theorems, making calculations, even
suggesting diagnosis of illness based on symptoms. 22
What has gradually proved to be the most resistant to computerization,
however, are the things that people do easily: natural language
communication, common sense reasoning, interpreting facts in context, and
devising explanations. The general trend in artificial intelligence is mirrored in
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the legal arena. Ambitious early statements have been replaced by more
limited projects. However, the relatively limited success in implementing legal
reasoning in artificial intelligence does not mean that efforts in the field have
not been fruitful. Such projects constitute some of the most interesting work
on legal reasoning. In trying to fit legal reasoning to the rigid constraints of
computer programming, researchers have achieved a number of detailed and
disciplined descriptions of how lawyers approach legal problems.
To give a sense of the state of the art of artificial legal intelligence, I will briefly
describe the HYPO program discussed by Kevin Ashley in his book, Modeling
Legal Argument. 23 HYPO seeks to evaluate disputes about trade secrets law
using some thirty cases. 24 HYPO does not actually use the judicial opinions in
the cases. Rather, a person reads each case and decides, for each of a list of
factors relevant to trade secret cases, whether the factor, such as whether
plaintiff and defendant make competing products, whether defendant was
formerly an employee of plaintiff, whether defendant paid an employee with
knowledge of plaintiff's product to leave plaintiff, or whether plaintiff disclosed
the alleged trade secret to any one, is present in the case. Accordingly, if there
were sixteen factors, 25 the actual data input for a case might be: 0010 0110
1110 1001. To use the program to select relevant precedents for a fact setting,
the person similarly determines if each factor is present in the set of facts to
be tested. 26 In other words, a person would run through the set of facts using
the list of factors, and input something like 1100 1010 1011 1111. HYPO then
compares the input to the thirty cases in the data base and returns the cases it
selects as closest to the fact setting, indicating whether defendant or plaintiff
was successful in each case. 27 To determine which cases are most relevant,
the program checks for the presence of certain factors in both the input
pattern and the case in the database. 28 To determine which cases are most
helpful to defendant or plaintiff's position, HYPO looks for similar clusters of
factors in cases in the database that were decided for each party. 29
Ashley makes no claim that HYPO automates the analysis of trade secrets
cases. In such a mechanical framework, most of the reasoning is still done by
the human involved, in deciding whether each factor appears in each case.
Rather, the project has considerable value because it shows what remains to
be done before fully automated legal reasoning can even be considered. HYPO
omits all consideration of the policies behind trade secret law and ignores the
ambiguity and vagueness inherent in the application of legal concepts to
factual settings. The HYPO approach also assumes that a complete list of
factors can be constructed. Of practical necessity, potentially determinative
factors, such as whether the information was already public, whether
defendant reverseengineered the product, or whether a release had been
signed, are not even considered. 30 No matter how long a list of factors one
devises, a good lawyer can always think of one more. Likewise, analysis of an
actual case could hardly be restricted to a given set of precedents in trade
secret law, nor could a lawyer ignore the possibility of a cause of action under
some other theory, such as tort or patent law.
Even after restricting the analysis to the given cases, the mathematical
tracking of the factors hardly conforms, as Ashley notes, to how they would
influence a court. For example, Ashley includes an extended discussion of why
factors relevant to a case could not be simply assigned numerical weights or
even a particular hierarchy. 31 Rather, the role that a factor plays in case
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analysis is "highly contextual and depends on individual problem situations." 32
Ashley discusses other considerations that make case law reasoning difficult to
fit into artificial intelligence paradigms: cases are not consistently "positive or
negative exemplars of concepts," 33 applying simple legal terms often requires
reaching more complex legal conclusions, 34 vague legal rules resist attempts
to make them precise, 35 and the relationship between legal principles and
analogical reasoning has yet to be described in a satisfactory way. 36
Indeed, Gray is perhaps a little too generous in referring to existing programs
as models of legal analysis, where they actually perform much more
mechanical tasks. Despite the occasional exaggerated description of a system's
capabilities or what it represents for future developments, none of the
developers claims that his program can accomplish the most basic task of a
lawyer: to read and understand a case or a statute. Indeed, in legal artificial
intelligence, as in artificial intelligence generally, the last few decades have
shown that the cognitive tasks that are easy for humans prove most difficult
for computers. 37 Common sense interpretation of ordinary verbal
communications are well beyond the capabilities of any computerized system
to date 38 (although of course computers can do many things well beyond
human mental capability, such as "remember" verbatim any number of judicial
opinions, even if they cannot understand them).
The obstacles that have prevented automation of the verbal and reasoning
skills that humans take for granted include a need for contextual knowledge, 39
an inability to deal with language's ambiguity and uncertainty, 40 and an
inability to plan for all contingencies. 41 All of these apply to the area of legal
reasoning, for the law is a very generalized activity, dependent on verbal
communication and full of ambiguity, contradiction, and amorphous reasoning.
Reasoning by analogy, the type of reasoning most often seen as characteristic
of legal reasoning, is likewise extremely resistant to effective computerization.
Indeed, there is still no generally accepted description of legal reasoning. 42
The rather mechanical nature of existing artificial intelligence programs
generally is reflected in the programs built to model legal reasoning tasks. The
most interesting thing about these projects is not what they do but rather what
they do not do. The greatest value in attempts to automate legal reasoning
may lie in showing just how difficult the project really is. 43 Thus, the author of
the HYPO program, in attempting to automate the analogical reasoning
process, identified which aspects of analogical reasoning could be readily
modeled and which aspects require a deeper theory than presently available. 44
Likewise, the process of designing the Legal Information Retrieval System led
to "several insights about semantics and modeling," as well as showing the
need for broader databases, increased semantic power, and a natural language
interface. 45
Moreover, a comparison of those computer projects with existing legal practice
undercuts Gray's suggestion that artificial legal intelligence appeared with the
computer and is on the verge of taking over the law. Rather, most forms of
computerized artificial intelligence have longestablished counterparts in the
more mundane world that one might call paper legal intelligence. Indeed,
these counterparts, with the advantage of much more time and resources
spent in development, still far outdistance the computer projects in scope and
achievement. For example, computerized casebased reasoning systems echo
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the wellknown West Key Number system, which organizes the law into subject
matter areas, then divides each area into dozens of categories and
subcategories. The Key Number system, of course, is a blunt instrument, but
certainly no less accurate than any of the computer systems and far greater in
scope. Likewise, expert systems are nothing new to the lawyer, who has
always relied on a simple but effective expert system: the legal form. A well
designed legal form  be it for a real estate closing, a motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction, or a software contract  does what an expert
system does: it attempts to reproduce the steps that a human expert would
follow in addressing a problem. But like computerized expert systems, forms
are also subject to mistakes if misused. Using the wrong form for a jurisdiction
can easily lead to dire consequences.
Richard Susskind's thoughtful writings on legal expert systems reflect the shift
in artificial intelligence from early optimism to measured skepticism, even as
attempts to create artificial intelligence have greatly increased knowledge of
human reasoning. In his 1987 work, Expert Systems in Law, 46 Susskind
surveyed work in the field and suggested that, although none of the existing
systems came close to duplicating the work of human experts, a deeper
approach, incorporating jurisprudential theory, could yield legal expert systems
that would rival or surpass lawyers in many core tasks. By 1996, Susskind
recognized in The Future of Law that although certain welldefined tasks could
be automated, a more useful approach would be to look to how information
technology could be incorporated into the practice of law, rather than replace
it. 47 Thus, rather than automating the reasoning of a lawyer, information
technology at present is better suited to augmenting the lawyer's ability to
retrieve and organize information and to communicate with others. 48
Accordingly, artificial intelligence projects in law, as in other fields, have
become more modest in their aspirations. Rather than seeking to emulate the
entire process of legal reasoning, developers devise programs that perform
specific, welldefined tasks. Casebased reasoning projects seek to provide
retrieval of relevant documents. Expert system projects take the users through
the preliminary steps of common types of cases. More ambitious projects like
neural networks are few in number, very likely because researchers have not
identified many promising possibilities. This general trend runs counter to
Gray's view that a huge program could automate all aspects of legal reasoning,
indeed the entire legal process. Such a program may or may not prove
feasible in the distant future, but is too remote from the present state and
direction of the art.
As noted above, however, Artificial Legal Intelligence looks beyond issues of
technological feasibility. The book's proposal that artificial intelligence will be
the next step in law ultimately rests not on technological grounds but rather on
a historical theory. English law is on the verge of the stage of codification, the
argument runs, and the complexity and volume of law require that such
codification take the form of computer systems that can perform the tasks of
lawyers and judges. Just as the Roman legal system was inevitably codified, so
must the English legal system inevitably become computerized in its final
stage. 49
Gray offers a very useful framework for thinking about the history of a legal
system, but her position lacks a deterministic force. She offers no reason why
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a legal system would not follow a different path. A system could react to the
overflowing of casuistry by retreating to theory rather than progressing to
codification. Indeed, a broader look at legal history raises similar questions.
The English legal system (rather than the continental systems, which certainly
use more explicit Roman concepts in both legal education and the legal system
50
) seems a counterintuitive choice as the successor to the Roman legal
system. On a broader level, why should succeeding systems pass through all
the stages from the starting point instead of building on one another? If the
English system is indeed the successor to the Roman, why would it start again
at the stage of ritual, which seems more like a reversion than an evolution?
Another possible objection to using the theory to predict the computerization of
the legal process is that the need for a development does not necessarily make
the development itself feasible. Even if one assumes that a stage of
codification is now imminent, Gray offers little support for the argument that
the law has become so voluminous and complicated that only computerization
can maintain the viability of the system. Such a claim requires some way of
measuring the complexity of such a system and a way of showing where it
would exceed the limits of present methods. More important, however, is the
non sequitur between the argument that the legal system will overload unless
it is computerized, and the claim that such computerization is therefore
feasible. Just because people need to do something does not imply that it can
be done.
Gray's vision of a computerized legal system thus depends on the success of
the strongest claims both for legal reasoning and for artificial intelligence,
coming at a time when proving such claims seems increasingly difficult. The
book has the fault of being too generous. Artificial Legal Intelligence views
"legal intelligence" as the accumulated legal knowledge and expertise of
centuries, viewed as an upward progression toward ever more exact
application of legal principles (p. 75). 51 Accordingly, the book takes an
uncritical stance toward the numerous, and sometimes contradictory, claims
about legal reasoning. Gray suggests incorporating as many views of legal
reasoning as possible into the future computerized legal Leviathan. Legal
reasoning has been characterized in many ways, and Gray's model seeks to
include all of them. According to this view, "theoretical choice," "dialectic
choice," "relative choice," "list choice," "spectrum choice," "paradoxical circular
choice," "inductive choice," "deductive choice," "hierarchical choice," "granular
choice," "temporal choice," "procedural choice," "combinatorial choice," and
"boundary choice," all have a place in the program (pp. 14050). In this
approach, Gray simply reflects a difficulty that legal artificial intelligence has
long faced. In order to attempt to model legal reasoning, one needs to start
with a description of what legal reasoning is. Yet, there are many theories of
legal reasoning, none with any greater claim to validity than the rest. But
before envisioning a world run according to such theories, one should first
consider the substantial grounds for skepticism about the claims made for legal
reasoning. In other words, all the competing theories about legal reasoning
cannot simultaneously be correct, so there would be no need for such a
program to incorporate them all. Indeed, a program that incorporated all
theories of the law would presumably yield some very strange results.
A recent book that incisively criticizes some of the grander claims made for
legal reasoning, and in so doing illustrates the risks of taking such theories as
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given, is Paul Campos's Jurismania. 52 Campos suggests that it is useful to
think of the present American legal system as showing signs similar to
symptoms of mental illness: obsessively perfectionist and abnormally attentive
to minor details. 53 The root cause, Campos suggests, is that the legal system
regularly attempts to do the impossible. Cases are frequently disputes within a
"social and legal equilibrium zone," meaning that neither legal rules nor social
norms dictate the outcome. 54 Legal rules and social policies are so numerous,
contradictory, and vague that it is impossible to determine a single outcome.
Rather than recognizing reality, however, the American legal system permits
the parties and a succession of courts to sink as many resources as possible
into trying to do the impossible and uncover the "right" result. Thus, a faith in
rationality drives the system to irrational efforts. One need not accept every
part of this view to see its potential implications for a fully computerized legal
system. Such a program might take a single case and happily hum along
forever, perhaps pausing periodically to issue interlocutory rulings. Even if
legal reasoning is not as quixotic as Campos suggests, one clearly would not
want simply to transfer all theories of legal reasoning without reservation into
a program that would then govern human disputes.
The proliferation of theories of legal reasoning is not the only fundamental
obstacle to a program automating legal reasoning. The very idea that legal
reasoning exists as a distinct form of reasoning is also increasingly less
accepted. Rather, trends in legal theory run more toward showing how legal
reasoning borrows freely from other types of reasoning. Scholars and lawyers
once generally assumed that legal reasoning was a specialized type of thinking
that could be practiced exclusively with the traditional tools of the lawyer:
cases, statutes, and analogical reasoning. 55 Recent attempts to analyze legal
reasoning, however, borrow widely from other fields in order to describe how
lawyers reason. In addition, law has become widely multidisciplinary in
nature. Economics, critical theory, political science, and other disciplines are
increasingly integrated into legal theory and the law itself. These developments
make construction of a program to automate legal reasoning even more
elusive, for they would require such a program to incorporate ever wider fields
of human endeavor.
With an eye toward considering the role of artificial intelligence in studying
legal reasoning, the remainder of this Note turns to a different approach to
the study of legal reasoning, one that nevertheless shares two of Gray's central
concerns. Gray's vision of legal reasoning is both computational and
evolutionary. But digital computer science is not the only approach to
computational thinking, and a cyclic paradigm of legal history is not the only
way to think of the law in evolutionary terms. Another way of thinking about
the law and legal reasoning is the model of evolution by natural selection, both
evolutionary psychology and the evolution of the law itself. 56 Here, I will briefly
survey how thinking about legal reasoning in evolutionary terms provides
several useful insights.
Evolutionary psychology attempts to analyze mental processes by considering
how the forces of natural selection shape our cognitive abilities. 57 It is thus
computational in a different sense from computer science. 58 While artificial
intelligence compares thinking to algorithmic processes, evolutionary
psychology seeks to explain psychological faculties by their adaptive value. 59
This approach to thinking proceeds on the useful assumption that "the mind is
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a system of organs of computation, designed by natural selection to solve the
kinds of problems our ancestors faced in their foraging way of life, in
particular, understanding and outmaneuvering objects, animals, plants and
other people." 60 Evolutionary psychology (although it has its own intellectual
hazards) offers a useful model for thinking about legal reasoning that does not
rely on legal scholars' models.
The work in evolutionary psychology that bears most directly on the law is the
study of what has been called the "moral sense." 61 Moral issues evoke not just
intellectual interest but visceral reaction. People have a very strong sense of
what they consider to be right and wrong, and much of the legal system is
devoted to rationalizing those sentiments. Evolutionary psychology offers a
number of interesting, though highly speculative, explanations. These
observations are less a guide to the logic of legal reasoning than a way to
uncover possible biases in reasoning that purports to be following legal
principles. Analysis shows that moral feelings, although honestly expressed,
may often be selfserving, even selfdeceptive. 62 In short, evolutionary
pressures would favor a "moral instinct" that serves the individual, rather than
society at large. This calls into question the many aspects of the legal process
that rely on unbiased or neutral actions of judges, jurors, and witnesses. In
particular, it counsels some skepticism about the ability of judges to engage in
pure legal reasoning unmindful of the collateral effects.
Another area of study in evolutionary psychology with great relevance to legal
reasoning is the apparent human faculty for devising explanations. Just as
people have an innate ability to learn languages, so too people appear to have
an innate ability to devise explanations for their experiences. 63 The
evolutionary argument for such a faculty is straightforward. There would have
been considerable adaptive value for primates able to come up with fruitful
hypotheses about their environment and about the other primates that
competed with them for resources. Over time, then, forces of natural selection
would favor those who inherited such a capacity. Empirical research, as well as
common experience, seems to support the existence of such a faculty. 64 As
with other ideas in evolutionary psychology, the idea of such an innate ability
is hardly novel. In the nineteenth century, Charles Sanders Pierce, whose
pragmatic philosophy has deeply influenced recent legal scholarship, proposed
that the human mind must in part be configured to make sense of the world. 65
Such an important cognitive ability must surely play a role in legal reasoning.
Many analyses of legal reasoning do contain references to how legal rules can
act as hypotheses, to explain disparate cases or give the reason behind certain
rules. 66
Evolutionary thinking allows us to compare the development of an explanatory
faculty as a survival mechanism, and the use of such a faculty in legal
reasoning. If it is a product of evolution, then early humans used it to do
things like categorize animals and plants, predict their properties, and make
use of them. 67 In such an environment, false hypotheses might be readily
recognized, rejected, and abandoned. In the context of legal reasoning,
however, a legal explanation is less likely to be subject to testing. Accordingly,
we should learn to exercise a certain skepticism about theories and other
conclusions that we make.
Combining the two areas above leads to some cautionary thinking about legal
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reasoning. Moral reasoning may sometimes be selfserving. Explanatory
reasoning, in legal domains, may provide useful hypotheses that are not
subject to testing against facts. Accordingly, we might suppose that there is a
particular risk of legal reasoning developing explanations that are appealing,
but are actually selfserving.
One might also note that although there is widespread agreement that people
are good at formulating hypotheses to explain their experiences, there is little
knowledge of just how we do it. Until that mental process is understood (and
there are no indications that this will happen soon) it seems unlikely that
anyone will be able to write computer programs to do the same thing. For this
reason, areas of reasoning, such as legal reasoning, that rely on explanatory
inferences, are likely to remain difficult to model with computers.
Evolutionary psychology might also supply food for thought not just about legal
reasoning, but about the reasoning of those affected by the law. Legal theory
makes a number of assumptions about how the law affects the decisions of
individuals. Evolutionary psychology might help question those assumptions. A
timely example is the role of status in affecting behavior, and how that could
affect the law and economics approach to legal theory. Economic analysis of
law centers on how law affects the incentives for people to make decisions.
Economics traditionally assumes that people take actions that they see as
being in their best interest, characterized in rather materialistic terms.
Evolutionary psychology asserts, however, that people are motivated not just
by materialistic desires but also by concerns of status. Accordingly, economic
analysis of law should pay more attention to the effect of status considerations.
68

Beyond evolutionary psychology, one can apply evolutionary thinking to the
development of the law itself, as some recent scholarship illustrates. Legal
rules and institutions develop over time, and may be influenced by forces
analogous to natural selection. Rules "compete" in the sense that individuals
and groups choose which rules to adopt. Thus, recent scholarship has
analyzed the forces that might influence how norms originate 69 and spread
among populations. 70 Similarly, some have analyzed how early society could
select from competing legal structures. 71
Another way that evolutionary thinking could be used in analyzing legal
reasoning is to ask how the law has adapted to human capabilities. Terrence
Deacon, building on the work of Noam Chomsky, has argued that the
development of language must have been influenced in part by human
cognitive capabilities. 72 The law can hardly be equated with language, which
plays a central role in human interaction and cognition. But the law, or some
system of rules, has likely accompanied culture throughout recent stages of
evolution. Accordingly, it might be fruitful to consider how the law has adapted
to human cognitive capabilities. For example, the most basic form of legal
argument is argument from cases. 73 With or without legal training, people
seem to take naturally to the use of precedent as argument. Even children
quickly show the ability to rely on previous "cases" to support their arguments.
74
It would be interesting to see if such skills could be linked to evolutionary
developments, and likewise to see if other forms of argument are less
adaptable to human cognitive abilities.
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Evolutionary thinking offers a lot to the study of legal reasoning, but it also
contains many intellectual hazards. In particular, one risks justifying existing
rules or institutions on the basis that some selection process must have culled
them as superior. Though evolutionary analysis can help to generate useful
hypotheses about law and legal reasoning, such hypotheses should be
measured carefully against empirical facts.
CONCLUSION
Artificial Legal Intelligence has a powerful vision of the benefits of a perfectly
informed, unbiased, and capable legal system. But such an optimistic view of
the evolution of law undercuts a greater contribution of artificial intelligence
techniques to the study of legal reasoning  the identification of a need for
close and skeptical examination of the legal reasoning process. 75 Artificial
Legal Intelligence proceeds on the assumption that law will steadily evolve
toward the ideal system portrayed. But evolutionary forces simply cause
adaptations, which can be for better or for worse. Accordingly, a broader
evolutionary model should look not just to the potential of law, but to its
limitations.
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